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A (fine) puzzle 
John was driving 150 km/h. The law says you cannot exceed 130 km/h, so 
John got fined. He got fined twice. “Why twice?” Because there were two 
speed detection devices—one at km 50 and one at km 100—so they caught 
him twice. “What if the devices were closer to each other, at km 50 and at km 
60?” Same story: if they catch you twice, you get fined twice. “What if there 
was a third device in between, at km 55?” Three devices, three measurements, 
three infractions—hence three fines. “But they could measure any number of 
times in between. What if they placed a device every kilometer?” They would 
fine you for each time a distinct device would measure an infraction. “But 
that is absurd. By that pattern, I could be fined uncountably many times for 
speed driving a single meter.”1 
Speed limits and other prohibitions 
Obviously, the “pattern” is a mathematical abstraction, and no one will ever 
risk bankruptcy for a brief infringement of the Traffic Code. But John’s law-
yer has a point. How long should the infringement last in order for two or 
more fines to be applicable? A fine is a punishment in which we incur if we 
perform a forbidden action—a crime—and there is a strong intuition to the 
effect that crimes and punishments should go hand in hand: every criminal act 
ought to be matched by a corresponding punishment, and every punishment 
ought to reflect a criminal act. We know how to count punishments, espe-
cially if they come in the form of a fine. But how do we count crimes?  
                                                
1 The puzzle is based on a (true) story reported in Ferraris (2004).  
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Consider the following suggestion. A crime is a criminal act, and we 
know how to count acts. There may be disagreement on how exactly this 
should be done, for there is no one-to-one correspondence between the words 
we use to pick out actions and the actions that we pick out. (Anscombe and 
Davidson famously argued that, say, Brutus’s killing of Caesar and his stab-
bing of Caesar are one and the same action under two different descriptions; 
Goldman and Kim argued that they are two different actions.2) But never 
mind that. A responsible philosopher should better have some views on this 
important matter; she should have some criteria for counting actions, at least 
actions of a kind. Hence, to the extent that our question is a philosophical one, 
every responsible philosopher should be able to answer it, some way or an-
other. If it is forbidden to φ, and if we know how to count an agent’s φings, 
then we know how many times the agent should be punished for having φed.  
Unfortunately, the suggestion falls short of a general solution to our prob-
lem. Our concept of an action is a mixed bag, and it is by no means clear that 
all kinds of action can be associated with counting criteria of the right sort. 
We can count stabbings and killings just as we count apples and fruits. But 
just as we cannot count waters, but only portions of water, we cannot count 
speed drivings, but only fractions thereof. Thus, if there is a law that says 
(1) Do not kill. 
we know exactly how to quantify the relevant crimes: we count the killings. 
Since every killing is unlawful, we have thereby counted the crimes. Perhaps 
there is also a law that says: 
(2) Do not stab. 
Then again we know how to quantify the relevant crimes: we just count the 
stabbings. When it comes to a case such as Brutus’s, we may disagree on the 
overall number of crimes he committed, since we may disagree on whether 
his stabbing of Caesar is one and the same action as his killing of Caesar, but 
never mind: nobody says that distinct crimes should be matched by distinct 
punishments. (For example, a dualist may still maintain that Brutus should 
only be punished once, since one crime—the killing—was performed by per-
forming the other—the stabbing.3) By contrast, if there is a law that says 
                                                
2 See Davidson (1969), Anscombe (1979), Kim (1969), and Goldman (1971).  
3 Compare: A dualist may insist that a thing and its matter are distinct while maintaining 
that when you buy a statue you ipso facto buy the clay, since the former is made of the latter. 
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(3) Do not drive faster than 130 km/h. 
then we are at loss. The prohibition does not specify the relevant count-
able units. If we go above the speed limit, we know that we are acting crimi-
nally; but we are completely in the dark as to the number of crimes we are 
committing.  
All of this suggests that prohibitions—and hence the relationship be-
tween crimes and punishments—are sensitive to the types of action they are 
directed to, and to the way those actions are characterized. It is one thing to 
prohibit a killing, or a stabbing; quite another to prohibit continuous actions 
such as speed driving, smoking, or playing on the turf—actions which, as Ar-
istotle put it, seem to be engaged in for their own sake 4 and whose canonical 
descriptions involve expressions that behave like mass terms. In fact, it is cus-
tomary to classify actions according to a typology that is more fine-grained 
than this. The standard typology, rooted in the works of Ryle, Kenny, and 
Vendler,5 distinguishes at least four different types:  
(a) Activities (e.g., John walked uphill) 
(b) Accomplishments (e.g., John climbed the mountain) 
(c) Achievements (e.g., John reached the top) 
(d) States (e.g., John knew the way up) 
The characteristic feature of an activity, or process, is that it is homogeneous 
(its sub-actions satisfy the same description as the activity itself) and has no 
natural finishing point or culmination; by contrast, an accomplishment may 
have a culmination (here: the reaching of the mountain’s top) but is never 
homogeneous; an achievement is a culminating event (and is therefore always 
instantaneous); and a state is homogeneous and may last over time, but it 
makes no sense to ask how long it took or whether it culminated. It is also 
customary to illustrate these distinctions with the help of aspectual considera-
tions, the basic idea being that different verbs correspond to different types of 
actions. Thus, verbs with no continuous form (‘know’) correspond to states; 
verbs with continuous form and for which the present continuous entails the 
past perfect (‘John is walking uphill’ entails ‘John walked uphill’) correspond 
to activities; and, lastly, verbs for which the present continuous entails the ne-
gation of the past perfect (‘John is climbing the mountain’ entails ‘John has 
not yet climbed the mountain’, provided he never did that before) correspond 
                                                
4 See Metaphysics IX.6. 
5 See Ryle (1949, Ch. 5), Vendler (1957) and Kenny (1963, Ch. 8).  
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to accomplishments and achievements, sometimes grouped together as “per-
formances”.6 
Now, it is not entirely clear whether this four-fold typology is to be re-
garded as classifying events in the world (i.e., action types) or pieces of lan-
guage (action verbs),7 but in the present context this worry is only partly rele-
vant: precisely insofar as prohibitions are speech acts, linguistic distinctions 
are just as crucial as ontological ones. The challenge, rather, is to see how 
such discriminations interact with our ordinary understanding of the structure 
of prohibitions. Let’s assume the standard typology is at least approximately 
correct. How does our notion of a criminal action—and the corresponding 
notion of a punishment—depend on whether the prohibited action is an activ-
ity, an accomplishment, an achievement, or a state?  
Forbidden states? 
Let us start from the end. Can states be prohibited at all? Surely, in everyday-
life contexts we often meet prohibitions that seem to be directed toward 
states, as in 
(4) It is forbidden to be asleep during the lesson. 
We have no problem understanding these prohibitions. However, it seems to 
us that in cases such as this, the prohibition does not concern the state itself, 
but rather some related action. Although one may say ‘do not be in state s’, 
often what is meant is best construed as a prohibition to act in a way that re-
sults in state s. For instance, (4) is naturally construed as shorthand for (4'): 
(4') It is forbidden to fall asleep (and keep on sleeping) during the lesson.  
Other times, what is forbidden is acting in a way that results from the relevant 
state. For instance, (5) is naturally construed as meaning (5'): 
(5) Don’t be selfish. 
(5') Do not act (or think) like a selfish person. 
Same cases are slightly more dubious. When we read  
(6) Standing in front of this door is strictly prohibited. 
                                                
6 For a systematic review, and further developments, see e.g. Parsons (1990, ch. 9) and 
Rothstein (2004). 
7 See e.g. Gill (1993) against Mourelatos (1978). 
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there seems to be no reference whatsoever to an action leading to the state of 
standing in front of the door, or to an action that results from that state. How-
ever, it is not even clear that standing in front of a door is a genuine state, as 
opposed to a monotonous (or “static”) activity. Indeed, if we apply the Kenny 
test, ‘stand’ does not qualify as a state verb, since it admits of the continuous 
form (unlike ‘know’). When a bona fide state is at issue, the very idea of pro-
hibiting it appears suspicious, if intelligible at all. Compare: 
(7) It is forbidden to know the shortest way to the top of the mountain. 
Our hypothesis is that no prohibition is ever directed toward a state. For this 
reason, we will set states aside in what follows, assuming that all prohibitions 
are ultimately directed towards genuine acts of some sort.  
Forbidden achievements 
In fact, prohibiting an achievement is partly problematic, too. If we say 
(8) No one is allowed to reach the top of the mountain. 
the scope of our prohibition is clear enough: you may walk uphill as far as 
you like, but you may not go “all the way”. The same applies to other typical 
achievements, as in 
(9) Do not cross the line. 
One may get as close to the line as one likes, but one may not cross it. To the 
extent that an achievement is the culmination of an activity, forbidding an 
achievement amounts to forbidding the completion of that activity. Since com-
pletions are instantaneous, the relevant counting criterion is straightforward: 
(Cach) If φing is an achievement, the number of times an agent x breaches a 
prohibition to φ is the number of time instants t such that ‘x φed at t’ is 
true. 
However, already Vendler included among the category of achievements also 
events such as finding something, recognizing someone, and the like. Argua-
bly, such events are instantaneous, too, and they can be counted accordingly. 
Yet it would seem that they cannot be meaningfully prohibited. Consider:  
(10) No one is allowed to find the money on the floor. 
The reason, we think, is that in cases such as this the achievement is not prop-
erly characterized as the culmination of an activity. Culminations are depend-
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ent events: their occurrence requires the occurrence of a previous activity of 
which they are, literally, the temporal boundary (reaching the top requires 
walking uphill; crossing the line requires approaching it). By contrast, in or-
der to find something, x, one need not be engaged in any particular activity 
that will culminate in the finding of x; one may just find x—suddenly, so to 
say, and perhaps accidentally—regardless of whatever one was doing before. 
In other words, finding something, as also noticing or recognizing something 
or someone, are independent achievements that do not mark the culmination 
or temporal boundary of any prior activity. And it seems that with respect to 
such independent achievements prohibitions do not make sense. Prohibitions, 
we submit, apply exclusively to dependent achievements, and insofar as such 
events are instantaneous, the counting criterion in (Cach) translates directly 
into a criterion for determining the number of times an agent should be pun-
ished for violating a corresponding prohibition. This number, n, is neither 
more nor less than the number of times the agent brings about an achievement 
of the relevant sort.8  
Forbidding accomplishments 
So we claim, first, that states cannot be properly forbidden and, second, that 
achievements can be forbidden (and punished) only if they are of the depend-
ent sort, as per criterion (Cach). Things begin to get puzzling when we move to 
the examination of prohibitions and punishments directed towards the two re-
maining sorts of action, namely, accomplishments and activities. Contrary to 
                                                
8 One may object that dependent achievements are temporally extended (albeit shortly 
so) rather than truly instantaneous, since we may report them using a gerundive form: 
(a)  John was reaching the top. 
(b) John was crossing the line. 
(c) John was touching the painting. 
We would reply that such gerundives do not report achievements strictu sensu. Rather, they 
have the effect of shifting the object of discourse from the achievement itself––which as such 
is truly instantaneous––to the activity on which it depends, in particular to its last phase, right 
before the culmination. Thus, for example, (a) says that John was about to complete a certain 
activity (walking uphill) and to accomplish something (climbing the mountain). Likewise, 
(b) says that John was about to cross the line. Cases such as (c) are more complex, because of 
an underlying ambiguity. On one reading, again, John was about to touch the painting. On a 
different reading, he was holding his finger on the painting. But this alternative reading does 
not refer to an achievement; it refers to a monotonous activity, so our general point is not 
affected.  
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achievements, actions of these sorts are not instantaneous: they always re-
quire a certain amount of time to be performed, and this introduces serious 
complications. 
Consider accomplishments, such as John’s climbing of a mountain. As 
we mentioned, there are two important features that characterize actions of 
this sort and distinguish them from activities: (i) they are not homogeneous 
(no proper part of John’s climbing of the mountain is itself a climbing of the 
mountain by John) and (ii) they are topologically “closed”, i.e., they include 
their own culminating achievements (John’s climbing of the mountain in-
cludes his reaching of the top). (Activities, by contrast, are homogeneous and 
topologically “open”). Because of these features, it would seem that accom-
plishments, too, could be associated with a straightforward counting principle. 
Specifically, (i) suggests the following principle:  
(Cacc) If φing is an accomplishment, the number of times an agent x breaches a 
prohibition to φ is the number of time intervals t such that ‘x φed over t’ 
is true. 
whereas (ii) suggests the following:  
(Cacc') If φing is an accomplishment, the number of times an agent x breaches a 
prohibition to φ is the number of time instants t such that ‘x cul(φ)ed at t’ 
is true, where a cul(φ)ing is any achievement that qualifies as a culmina-
tion of a φing. 
These two principles are equivalent. For instance, if the law says 
(11) Climbing Mount Everest is forbidden. 
we can count the number of times an agent breaches the law by counting the 
number of intervals corresponding to the duration of a full climbing of Mount 
Everest or, equivalently, by counting the number of times the agent has 
reached the top of Mount Everest by climbing. Likewise, and more plausibly, 
we can count the number of times an agent breaks a prohibition such as 
(12) Crossing the street is against the law. 
by counting the intervals corresponding to the duration of a full crossing of 
the street or, equivalently, the number of times the agent has reached the other 
side of the street by going right through it. The same sort of consideration ap-
plies to cases such as (1) and (2), which may also be classified as accom-
plishments. However, closer inspection indicates that neither formulation de-
livers reasonable results in all cases. 
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Consider (12) and suppose John walks across the street up to a few feet 
from the opposite side and then turns around. Both (Cacc) and (Cacc') will de-
liver the same verdict: John has not breached the prohibition, hence he should 
not be punished. But this seems ludicrous. Surely any charitable reading of 
(12) suggests that John is liable to be punished, regardless of the fact that he 
fell short of a full crossing of the street. Consider also:  
(13) Thou shall not eat any apple from this tree. 
Suppose Adam and Eve spent the whole day eating from the forbidden tree, 
leaving all the apple cores on the ground. Surely they could hardly plea inno-
cent by arguing that they have not eaten any apple entirely. “You told us not 
to eat any apples from this tree, and we haven’t; we have only eaten apple 
parts—and we mean proper parts.” In short: (Cacc) and (Cacc') appear to be too 
strict. A prohibition is a speech act, and every speech act must be interpreted 
against the background of shared knowledge and presuppositions, and with 
Gricean wisdom. Strictly speaking, (12), (13), and the like say that we are not 
allowed to accomplish something, φ (cross a street, eat an apple), but what is 
really meant is that we are not allowed to engage in any activity that may turn 
into a φing (activities such as walking across a certain street or eating stuff 
from a certain tree). In this sense, both John and the Eden dwellers are cul-
pable of having broken the prohibition: even though they have not accom-
plished the forbidden actions, they have engaged in the underlying criminal 
activities. 
Shall we say that the problem here is merely pragmatic? Strictly speak-
ing, (Cacc) and (Cacc') are correct. It’s just that we often phrase a prohibition in 
terms of an accomplishment when in fact we intend to prohibit any activity 
that may turn into those accomplishments. If so, however, we have to be clear 
about our criteria for counting activities. More precisely, we have to provide 
precise criteria for determining how many times an agent may be said to have 
breached a prohibition to engage in a criminal activity. How many times did 
John breach the prohibition to cross the street, understood as the activity to 
walk across it? How many times did Adam and Eve breach the command-
ment, charitably construed as the prohibition to eat from the forbidden tree? 
Activities 
Like accomplishments, activities take time. Unlike accomplishments, how-
ever, activities are homogeneous and do not include a culmination point. If it 
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is true that John is (or ‘was’, or ‘has been’) walking across the street for one 
minute, then it is true that he is (was, has been) walking across the street 
for every time stretch within that minute. Moreover, at each moment during 
that minute it is correct to say both that John is walking across the street and 
that he has been walking across the street: the time stretch of an activity is 
inherently indefinite and it is in this sense that an activity is topologically 
open. 
Now, there is no question that activities can be prohibited. Our original 
example in (3) is a case in point, but there are plenty—for instance: 
(14) Walking uphill on this mountain is forbidden. 
(15) Do not play in the garden. 
(16) Smoking is against the law. 
Prohibitions such as these are clear to understand, and we meet them daily. 
However, precisely because activities are homogeneous and open, neither 
(Cacc) nor (Cacc') provides us with a criterion for saying how many times we 
may properly be said to infringe an activity. What alternatives are there? Two 
options suggest themselves, but both have problems. 
The first option relies on the feature of homogeneity. Question: “How 
many times should I be punished for having φed?” Answer: “As many times 
as you have been φing”. More precisely: 
(Cact) If φing is an activity, the number of times an agent x breaches a prohibi-
tion to φ is the number of times t such that ‘x is φing at/over t’ is true. 
Here it doesn’t matter whether t is a time instant or a time interval, for we 
have just seen that the homogeneity property holds with respect to both. It is 
true that not every proper part of an activity such as walking is itself a walk-
ing: there is a granularity issue here, and we may want to say that one cannot 
be walking for just a second.9 Moreover, we have said that no genuine activ-
ity can be instantaneous, so obviously one cannot be walking for an instant. 
Still, we have also seen that, given any suitable interval of time, if an agent is 
walking during that interval then, for every subinterval and every instant 
within that interval, it is also true that the agent is (was, has been) walking 
over/at that subinterval/instant. This is what homogeneity amounts to, in the 
relevant sense. 
                                                
9 See, for instance, Simons (1987: 139), who takes into account cases of partial and rela-
tive “dissectivity”. 
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Unfortunately, precisely because activities take time, all of this implies 
that (Cact) is hopelessly prolific. This is the gist of our opening puzzle. Let 
φ be an activity verb. If we assume that the time series is dense (if not con-
tinuous), it immediately follows from (Cact) that whenever we breach a prohi-
bition to φ, we breach it infinitely (if not uncountably) many times. And even 
if time were not dense, it would follow that we breach the prohibition a vast 
number of times, one for each instant or period within the maximal interval 
during which we may be said to have been φing. This is preposterous.  
The second strategy exploits the idea that although activities are topo-
logically open, they do come to an end. People do not keep walking forever; 
it’s just that the end of their walk is not part of their walk (whereas the end of 
a mountain climbing is part of the climbing). Now, when we talk about a per-
son’s walking, we often—if not typically—have in mind the whole thing, i.e., 
the action that extends over the maximal period of time t such that it is true 
that the agent has been walking over t. Accordingly, if there is a law that pro-
hibits a person from walking (in a certain place), it is plausible to suppose that 
it is the number of her “maximal walks” that matters. More generally, the fol-
lowing principle suggests itself: 
(Cact') If φing is an activity, the number of times an agent x breaches a prohibi-
tion to φ is the number of maximally connected intervals t such that ‘x is 
φing over t’ is true. 
This principle avoids the absurd prolificness of (Cact). However, it suffers 
from the opposite defect: it is too coarse grained. Consider John and Tom. 
Both drove 150 kilometers on the same highway, and both infringed the speed 
limit of 130 km/h. However, John did that by driving 150 km/h for (almost) 
an hour, i.e., for (almost) the entire ride, whereas Tom only went over the 
limit for a minute, i.e., for 2.5 kilometers, and otherwise drove slowly. Ac-
cording to (Cact'), both John and Tom infringed the law once and are, there-
fore, equally liable to punishment. But surely that is unfair. Worse: suppose 
Tom went over the limit twice—once around km 50 and once around km 100. 
Then there are two maximally connected intervals over which it is true that 
Tom has been driving faster than 130 km/h, hence he should be punished 
twice, whereas John’s constantly fast driving would be enough to earn him a 
single fine. Even worse, consider what happened next, as John and Tom left 
the highway and drove through a large, highly populated town. The speed 
limit is 50 km/h. John drove through the whole town at 100km/h. Tom drives 
slowly, but closer inspection reveals that he actually exceeded the speed lim-
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its a few times. If the police relied on (Cact'), John would get one ticket 
whereas Tom would get a whole bunch of them. Clearly this is not how things 
should go.10 
Indeed, both (Cact) and (Cact') have undesired consequences with respect 
to our early criterion for evaluating the breaching of prohibitions directed to-
ward accomplishments. We have seen that (Cacc) and (Cacc') are too strict: of-
ten, we phrase a prohibition in terms of an accomplishment with the intention 
of prohibiting any activity that may turn into an accomplishment of that sort. 
But then the limits of both (Cact) and (Cact') affect those prohibitions, too. 
Consider Adam and Eve. How many times did they breach the command-
ment, understood as the prohibition to eat stuff from the forbidden tree? If we 
rely on (Cact), the answer is: infinitely (or very many) times, even if they just 
had a few bites from a single apple. If we rely on (Cact'), the answer is: once, 
even if they went on eating (leaving the apple cores) for days.  
Crimes and punishments 
We know how things work in practice. John got fined twice because he was 
caught twice: he drove pass two speed detection devices at 150km/h. Had 
there been more devices, he would have been fined more times. The number 
of fines is determined by the number of measurements, which in turn is de-
termined by the number of detection devices, and the latter is determined by 
pragmatic considerations. The police could put a device every meter, but they 
don’t: it would be too harsh. They could put just one device on the entire 
highway, but they don’t: that would be too lenient. So they put a few, based 
on contextual considerations.11 In practice, it is contextual and pragmatic fac-
tors (implicit, if not explicit) that determine how many times we infringe a 
law by engaging in some illicit activity. In practice, when it comes to tempo-
rally extended actions, it is contextual and pragmatic considerations that de-
termine what counts as a relevant “unit” the performance of which deserves to 
be punished. So although (Cach) may well be regarded as the correct counting 
                                                
10 If we counted the times we infringe the law by the times we end doing something, we 
would still have the very same problem, plus some further implausibility. It’s not just that 
cops do not wait us until we slow down in order to fine us; insofar as they ask us to stop, they 
would actually force us to breach the law. (There are exceptions, though: consider Keanu 
Reeves in the movie Speed.) 
11 Sometimes such pragmatic considerations are explicitly formalized: check what your 
state law says about leaving your car parked when the money in the meter is finished. 
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criterion for certain instantaneous achievements, and (Cacc) or (Cacc') correct 
criteria for counting accomplishments structu sensu, when it comes to ex-
tended actions (activities or accomplishments broadly understood) the correct 
counting criterion is something along the following lines: 
(Cext) If φing is an extended action, the number of times an agent x breaches a 
prohibition to φ is the maximum number of pairwise disjoint connected 
intervals t—of some contextually determined length—such that ‘x is φing 
over t’ is true. 
If φing is an activity, the truth of ‘x is φing over t’ implies that of ‘x φed over 
t’, and that’s the whole story. If φing is an accomplishment, the truth of ‘x is 
φing over t’ does not imply that of ‘x φed over t’, and perhaps there is or will 
never be a longer interval t' that would fit the bill. This is the infamous “im-
perfective paradox”.12 Yet insofar as accomplishment verbs admit of the pre-
sent continuous, the prohibition applies as well.13 
Now, contextual discriminations need not be entirely arbitrary. They 
may, in fact, be the best expression to our rational views. Nonetheless, they 
are conventional. There is no fact of the matter that justifies their being intrin-
sically “correct”. They are, therefore, good (at least in principle) if we are in-
terested in how many times an agent is liable of punishment, given the com-
munity to which she belongs. But if we are interested in quantifying her 
wrong doings—her crimes—we have reasons to feel bewildered. We can 
count some of her criminal achievements (the dependent ones) and we can 
count some of her criminal accomplishments (understood strictu sensu), but 
every other crime seems to be up for grabs. 
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